Abstract-Most recent discussion of the provocation defence has focused on the objective test, and little attention has been paid to the subjective test. However, the subjective test provides a substantial constraint: the killing must result from a provocation that undermines the defendant's self-control. The idea of loss of selfcontrol has been developed in both the philosophical and psychological literatures.
The basic structure of the provocation defence, by which a murder charge can be reduced to manslaughter, is straightforward. As all criminal lawyers know, it consists of a union of two tests: a 'subjective' test, which asks whether the defendant was provoked to lose his self-control, and whether he committed the killing as a result of that loss; and an 'objective' test, which asks whether the provocation was sufficient to make a reasonable person do as the defendant did. Recent judgments, and much recent academic discussion, have been preoccupied with the objective test. Yet this focus of interest has not led to consensus. Indeed, it is fair to say that that understanding of the objective test is in some disarray.
We contend that this stems largely from asking the objective test to do 1 The central ideas in this article have been developed from a paper delivered by the authors at a conference on Human Nature in Law and Political Morality held at the University of Cambridge in 2002, and at the annual conference of the Australian Society of Legal Philosophy, held at the University of Sydney in 2003. The authors would like to thank the audiences on those occasions, and an anonymous referee, for comments that greatly improved the article; and the Arts and Humanities Research Council for granting them each research leave that allowed work on it. 2 Professor of Philosophy, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 3 Professor of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, School of Law, University of Birmingham. too much work: work that should have been done by the subjective test. The subjective test is far more complex, and far more demanding, than has been generally realized. It requires not simply that agents must kill in response to provocation, but that they must kill as a result of losing self-control in response to provocation. We aim to take seriously the idea of loss of selfcontrol. 4 Once we do so, we find that the subjective test provides a substantial hurdle, for the simple reason that only an agent who antecedently possessed self-control can lose it as a result of provocation.
To borrow Muddy Water's words, you can't lose what you ain't never had;
nor, we might add, can you lose what you have already lost.
Irascibility and drunkenness plausibly fall into the class of characteristics that should result in the defendant failing the subjective test.
Irascible agents have never gained self-control
5
; drunks have already lost it.
There is therefore no need to insist that the objective test must be formulated in such a way as to exclude them. To say this is not to suggest, of course, that the law should dispense with the objective test altogether. It retains a crucial role. It is just to say that much of the work that it has been called upon to do can be better done by the subjective test. Furthermore, getting clear on the subjective test will bring a better understanding of the objective test, since it too concerns the loss of self-control. We return towards the end of this paper to the question of how work should be apportioned between the two tests; we start by examining the subjective test.
4 In contrast, the Law Commission has recently recommended that the subjective element be removed completely from the defence: see Partial Defences to Murder, Law Com No. 290, Cmnd 6301 (2004); and Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, Law Com No. 304, HC 30 (2006) . As Horder has rightly observed, this change 'detaches the plea of provocation from reliance on one of the key justifications for its legal recognition'; see J. Horder, 'Reshaping the Subjective Element in the Provocation Defence ' (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 123, at p. 133. However, Horder is sceptical about how much weight the subjective criterion can put on the idea of loss of self-control, claiming that it 'might be thought to be more metaphorically than psychologically descriptive ' (p. 126) . Notwithstanding disagreements here, we have considerable sympathy with many of Horder's broader contentions, and return to discuss them at the end of this paper. 5 Or at least, that is true of one sort of irascible agent; we discuss below the possibility of agents who have
WHAT IS SELF-CONTROL?
In the classic definition given above, Devlin J says that to lose one's selfcontrol is to be no longer master of one's mind. If that is right, then selfcontrol itself must consist in mastery of one's mind. 10 But in what does this mastery consist? There are three main accounts to be found in the philosophical and psychological literature:
(1) Self-control consists in the ability to bring one's actions, into line with one's second-order desires: i.e., it is the ability to ensure that the desires upon which one acts are the desires upon which one desires to act;
(2) Self-control consists in the ability to bring one's actions into line with one's judgments about what it would be best to do;
(3) Self-control consists in the ability to bring one's actions into line with one's resolutions and commitments.
These are clearly competing accounts (though they will classify many cases the same way 11 ), so we need to adjudicate between them. But before doing so, let us focus on two things that they have in common. First, note that all three accounts agree that self-control consists in a particular kind of control over one's actions-in each case the obvious contrast is with actions that are driven purely by one's (first-order) desires. Accordingly, loss of selfcontrol involves a loss of this particular kind of control. It does not require that the agent 'goes berserk', loses control of her body, or fails to know what she is doing. 12 The agent will still be an agent when self control is lost, and her acts will still be intentional, driven by a desire for revenge, or whatever. But what is lost when one loses self-control is control over 10 Compare Tindal CJ's description of the provocation defence in R v Hayward (1833) 6 C & P 157, at p. 159:
'… while smarting under a provocation so recent and so strong, that the prisoner might not be considered at the moment the master of his own understanding …' 11 Consider, for example, a dieter who wishes that he didn't want to eat more, who judges that it would be better if he ate less, and who has resolved to do so. When he exercises self-control by refusing some tempting food, he meets the conditions set by all three accounts of self-control.
which mental elements drive one's actions; and that, to return to the formulation of Devlin J, is to lose a certain kind of mastery over one's mind. 13 Second, note that whilst our primary focus is on provocation, the notion of self-control has a much wider application. The three accounts that we are examining were initially proposed to characterize self-control in the face of temptation: resisting a cigarette for instance, or sticking to a diet (some of this literature is discussed below). At a push, we might try to take temptation as the essential factor and assimilate provocation to it-the defendant succumbs to the temptation to kill. But the move is most unnatural. Moreover, there are other cases that are different again. Selfcontrol can be needed, for instance, to overcome the fear that would otherwise make one flee situations of danger; or in cases where elation risks leading one to disregard prudence. These are not naturally described as cases of either provocation or temptation. Nevertheless, there is clearly something that these diverse cases have in common: they all involve an attempt to overcome certain inclinations ('passions') that would otherwise move us. We might conjecture that there is a similar mechanism at work in each. As we shall see, this conjecture is borne out by the empirical evidence.
Bearing in mind these points in which the three accounts agree, let us now turn to the ways in which they differ. The first account, which comes from Harry Frankfurt, has been highly influential in philosophy. 14 It has also, however, been widely criticized; indeed, in later work Frankfurt himself The suggestion, then, is that there is a distinct faculty of self-control that enables agents to do what they judge best in the face of strong inclinations to the contrary; and that this faculty standardly works by employing prior resolutions. Agents who lacked self-control could still perform intentional actions: it is just that their actions would be driven by their immediate inclinations.
In suggesting this, we have not gone far beyond common-sense ('folk') psychology: that is, we have not gone far beyond the theory of mind that is embedded in ordinary everyday practices, and in the law. However, when we turn to more systematic psychology, we also find support for this view.
Furthermore, the empirical literature contains suggestive findings on how the faculty works: it appears that self-control operates in many ways like a muscle. None of these arguments is conclusive; but, together with the common-sense considerations, they give rise to a very persuasive case.
Developmental evidence
We do not know of any empirical studies on the development of the ability to exercise self-control in the face of provocation; but there is extensive work on the development of self-control in the face of temptation. Walter
Mischel and his colleagues have tested children on their ability to delay gratification to achieve greater reward. 26 For instance, they are told that they will receive one cookie if they ring a bell, which they are free to do at any time; but that they will get two if they refrain from ringing the bell until an adult comes in. The researchers found that ability to wait comes in 25 Arguably, there is an even closer connection between strength of will and self-control, which is that only a prior commitment would have the necessary motivating force to overcome contrary desires. The issue turns on the doctrine of internalism: on whether a moral judgment can by itself be capable of moving us to action, or whether it needs something else, such as a desire or an intention. We cannot pursue the issue here. As we have said, none of these considerations is compelling on its own.
But together they do make a persuasive case for the existence of a real faculty of self-control, one which works by keeping a person to her considered judgments in the face of changing desires.
LOSS OF SELF-CONTROL
We are now in a position to broach the second of Importantly for our concerns, so does anger. We do not simply mean that anger will sometimes overwhelm our self-control, in the sense that we have insufficient self-control to deal with it. We mean that it can actively undermine self-control: the effect of anger can be to destroy the self-control that we would otherwise have. Anger thus undermines the very thing that is supposed to control it.
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This gives rise to an important result. If an agent suffers a provocation and responds with some violent act, there can be two quite different explanations of why she acts as she does. The first is that she lacked sufficient self-control to handle the provocation: it simply gave rise to violent inclinations that her self-control was unable to restrain, inclinations that therefore moved her to perform the violent act. The second explanation, in contrast, accepts that the agent did have sufficient self-control to handle the violent inclinations. However, the provocation
446.
33 In speaking of current desires we do not exclude the possibility that these might be desires for the future; the point is that they are desires which are currently held, rather than desires which the agent knows he once held, or will come to hold. 34 Self-control is thus an instance of what is known in philosophy as a 'finkish' disposition: a disposition that can be disabled by the very stimulus to which it is supposed to react. (The term was introduced by C. B. Martin; it was finally published in his 'Dispositions and Conditionals ' (1994) The modern law of provocation is consistent with the idea that if the defendant generally lacks the relevant ability to control himself (i.e., his self-control is so weak that it can be overwhelmed by an inclination to kill without it having been undermined by provocation), he will not be able to make use of the provocation defence. For, although the burden of disproving provocation lies with the prosecution, an habitually aggressive or violent person will be unable to avail himself of the provocation defence if he cannot establish that there was a reasonable possibility both that he had been provoked, and that, as a result, he had lost his self-control. Where that is not the case, the trial judge is entitled to withdraw the issue from the jury.
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We have described the irascible agent as someone who lacks sufficient self-control. But, given our account of self-control, there is surely another possibility: the agent who has sufficient self-control to constrain his anger, but whose self-control is always undermined by the slightest provocation.
Such an agent would surely pass the subjective test (though they would be likely to fall to the objective). We concede the theoretical claim, but question the significance of the possibility. It is not that there would be no evidence to distinguish an irascible agent whose self-control was habitually undermined from one whose self-control was habitually overwhelmed. The former would show a systematic loss of self-control, which the latter would Irascible agents have a long-tem lack of self-control. Other cases involve agents for whom, at the time of the provocation, self-control had already been temporarily lost: for instance, through drunkenness. There is good evidence that the effect of alcohol is primarily to remove self-control, rather than to induce violent behaviour per se. 40 So a drunken agent will also standardly fail the subjective test.
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(ii) If there is evidence that the agent did possess the requisite power of selfcontrol prior to the provocation, we then need to ask whether there is evidence that her self-control was lost as a result of the provocation. Since it is a faculty being lost, it should show up in a loss of self-control across the board. The contrast is with cases in which the faculty of self-control remains in place, but where it is ineffectual against the urge to retaliate:
cases where, to use our earlier terminology, it is overwhelmed, not undermined.
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Of course, as we have seen, in losing the faculty of self-control the 41 Note that in cases in which the loss of self-control is caused by some factor other than the provocation, that factor need not precede the provocation. It may be contemporaneous with, or even subsequent to, it. If A provokes B and, mulling over the smart, B subsequently drinks heavily, as a result loses his self-control, and then retaliates, it is not the provocation that was the cause of the loss of self-control (even though it was one of the causes of the retaliation). 42 Overwhelming is what standardly happens in cases of temptation. Agents who succumb to temptationeating more than they judge they should, starting an illicit affair, or whatever-will not normally lose selfcontrol in other areas. Their self-control has been overwhelmed in one area, but it has not been undermined across the board. We further need to distinguish both cases of overwhelming and of undermining from cases in which the agent simply judges that the best course is to respond to provocation with violence, and does so. Once again the provocation defence cannot be invoked, but now for the simple reason that there is no loss of control.
agent doesn't need to 'go berserk'. 43 Without self-control we can still have an intentional agent, one who will, for instance, make reasoned choices about the means of effecting the killing: she will be more likely to pick up a hammer than a cushion to use as a weapon, more likely strike the provoker than an innocent passer-by. 44 Nevertheless, we would expect a loss of selfcontrol to have a systematic effect on those actions that it would ordinarily inhibit. So, for instance, a lack of concern on the part of the agent for her own long-term welfare (manifested, say, in a lack of concern about being caught) would be evidence that self-control was in fact lost; in contrast, evidence of such concern (donning gloves before picking up the hammer to ensure that no finger prints were left) would be evidence that it was not. it out. The best evidence comes from measures of the physical arousal to which it gives rise. Ask someone to engage in self-control and they will show the standard signs of physiological arousal that accompany effort:
changes in blood pressure, pulse, skin conductance etc. 51 But effort comes in degrees. So might it not be that, when we talk of provocation causing loss of self-control, we should really be talking of it raising the effort needed if self-control is to be maintained? Indeed, some psychologists argue that it is almost never the case that one literally could not resist an inclination to retaliate to a provocation; it is simply that such resistance would require a very great deal of effort. 52 If this is right, it suggests that the all-or-nothing model is mistaken: since effort comes in degrees, and so does self-control.
We think that such an argument moves too fast. In the first place, it does not follow from the mere fact that self-control requires effort that it cannot be lost altogether. It could be that maintaining self-control requires effort up until the point at which it is lost, after which no amount of effort will bring it back. (Pulling on a rubber band requires effort, but that is our model for the thing that can snap.) But suppose that we accept that the agent always could have maintained self-control if he had expended more effort: that unlike the broken rubber band, the control lines still remain in place, even if they are far harder to manipulate. Does it follow that talk of the agent literally losing self-control is out of place? Should we not rather talk of self-control being diminished? just to explain the way in which it was lost, not to deny that it has been lost.
What this line of thinking brings out is that the agent is to some degree compromised by his loss of control. Had he made more of an effort he could have maintained it, and this shows that some blame attaches to him, even if making more of an effort was, at that point, beyond him. Yet that seems right. Provocation is only a partial defence; if it brings no blame, should the agent not be acquitted? We shall return to this point later.
(iii) If self-control was lost as a result of the provocation, is there reason to think that this loss was the cause of the homicide? It is often said that loss of self-control is inconsistent with motives of revenge or punishment. 53 We suspect, however, that a desire for revenge or punishment is present in almost every case in which self-control is lost as a result of provocation.
The crucial point is rather whether the agent would have been moved to kill by such a desire even in the absence of a loss of self-control. We said that if the agent is to invoke a provocation defence, she must have had sufficient self-control prior to the provocation to resist any inclination to kill. But such self-control will only be employed if the agent believes that the best thing is not to kill-we characterized self-control as the ability to bring one's actions into line with what one judges best. It is quite possible for an agent who has self-control to embark on a plan to kill someone because they judge this the best thing to do: because they judge the victim deserves it, for instance. In such a case, if it is this prior decision that causes the killing, then a subsequent loss of self-control is beside the point, since it is not the loss of self-control that causes the killing. The provocation defence cannot properly be invoked. 54 It is here that we think that talk of motives, or better still intentions, of revenge and punishment are relevant to defeating a provocation defence: not because they are inconsistent with the defence, but because they can provide (defeasible) evidence that the loss of self-control was causally irrelevant.
WHY MUST THE LOSS BE SUDDEN AND TEMPORARY?
We have so far said nothing to answer our third question, the significance of the words 'sudden and temporary' in the Duffy definition. This is sometimes read as imposing a requirement of contemporaneity: a requirement that the reaction follow immediately on the provocation. This in turn is sometimes held to be part of the very nature of provocation. 55 This latter claim is surely wrong. If the provocation was sufficient to induce a loss of self-control, then (given that the agent will not have the capacity to wait on prudential grounds) it is likely that it will produce an immediate reaction. But there is nothing in the nature of loss of self-control that requires this. It might, for example, be that no opportunity to retaliate has yet presented itself. And just as it is false to assume that once self-control is lost a reaction will follow immediately, so it is false to assume that a loss of self-control will occur, if it occurs at all, immediately a person is provoked.
As many have come to realise, some people have slow fuses. It is perfectly possible to smoulder for a long time before finally losing control.
Could it be, though, that the words 'sudden and temporary' in Duffy embed an independent requirement of contemporaneity in the provocation defence, even if this does not follow from the nature of loss of self-control. Time for reflection may show that after the provocative conduct made its impact on the mind of the defendant, he or she kept or regained control. The passage of time following the provocation may also show that the subsequent attack was planned or based on motives, such as revenge or punishment, inconsistent with the loss of self-control and therefore with the defence of provocation. In some cases, such an interval may wholly undermine the defence of provocation; that, however, depends entirely on the facts of the individual case and is not a principle of law.
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Clearly Lord Taylor is here rejecting the idea that the provocation defence imposes a contemporaneity requirement; a delayed response is, at most, evidence that the defence is inapplicable for other reasons. 58 However, almost in the same breath that he rejected a contemporaneity requirement, Lord Taylor forthrightly defended the Duffy test. The expression 'sudden and temporary loss of control', he said, 'encapsulates an essential ingredient of the defence of provocation in a clear and readily understandable phrase.
It serves to underline that the defence is concerned with the actions of an 56 Criminal Law, 7th edition (London: Butterworth, 1992) at p. 355. 57 See R v Ahluwalia, n. 6 above, at pp. 897-898. In the 10 th edition of his textbook on Criminal Law (London: Butterworths, 2002) Professor J.C. Smith wrote, at p. 368: 'It seems that the words, "sudden and temporary," imply only that the act must not be premeditated. It is the loss of control which must be "sudden," which does not mean "immediate."' 58 What should we make of Lord Taylor's insistence that motives of revenge or punishment are inconsistent with the defence, something that we have already denied? We suspect that what is being ruled out is a form of deliberate or planned revenge that would indeed hardly be compatible with a loss of selfcontrol, since it would require the kinds of calculation that that state would preclude; however, this is hard to reconcile with Lord Taylor's approval of Devlin J's claim in R v Duffy (n. 8 above, at p. 932) that 'circumstances which induce a desire for revenge are inconsistent with provocation, since the conscious formulation of a desire for revenge means that a person has had time to think, to reflect, and that would negative a sudden temporary loss of self-control which is of the essence of provocation.' individual who is not, at the moment when he or she acts violently, master of his or her own mind.' 59 This trenchant defence of Duffy, combined with a refusal to accept that the fatal act must have immediately followed the provocation, raises the question of how the words 'sudden and temporary'
can underline the idea of an individual who is not master of his or her own mind.
We suggest that the primary force of these words is simply to underline the applicability of the model of loss of self-control that we have presented. If loss of self-control is sudden, then it is not a gradual process;
rather, it happens in a stroke. Talk of sudden loss thus naturally suggests the idea of the broken elastic band, and of the loss being complete. Of course, there is no entailment here: there remains the possibility of sudden but partial loss. But a certain difficulty is logically precluded. Since the loss is sudden, there is no transitional period in which the agent has merely reduced self-control, and hence no problem about knowing how to treat a killing performed in that period.
It is less clear what idea is introduced by the insistence on temporary loss.
Since we know of no cases in which this requirement has been invoked, we can only speculate. What this requirement presumably does is exclude nontemporary (i.e., permanent) losses of self-control from the ambit of the defence. What is the rationale for this? It could simply be that when the loss is permanent, insanity, and not provocation, is the appropriate defence.
But it is possible that the consideration here is also addressing one of the evidential questions raised above. Where self-control is evident as soon as the anger has subsided, we have good, though defeasible, grounds for thinking that it was indeed undermined by the anger, rather than having been absent in the first place. If so, though, it seems that temporariness should follow contemporaneity in being treated as an evidential 59 See R v Ahluwalia, n. 6 above, at p. 895.
-25 -consideration rather than a principle of law.
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO THE RECENT CONTROVERSY
We have outlined an account of provocation that follows both the letter and the spirit of the law in taking the idea of self-control seriously. We now turn to apply this to some of the recent legal controversy. As we mentioned at the outset, much of this has focused on the issue of whether the different degrees of self-control that different people have should affect their eligibility to employ the provocation defence. The core of the debate has concerned the objective test, and its requirement that the provocation was sufficient to make a reasonable person do as the defendant did.
In asking whether a reasonable person could have acted as the defendant did, our aim is, of course, to ascertain whether the defendant's behaviour was itself reasonable. But we should not hold everyone to the same standard of reasonableness. Since different agents have different characteristics, what is reasonable for some might not be reasonable for others. If the objective test is to be sensitive to such differences, we must therefore in turn attribute these characteristics to the reasonable person with whom the defendant is to be compared. But that raises the question of whether this should be done with all of the defendant's characteristics. If the defendant is depressed, or irascible, or drunk, should we compare him with a reasonable person who is similarly depressed, or irascible, or drunk?
Moreover, if we attribute these characteristics to the reasonable person who serves as our standard, is this to help us determine the severity of the provocation produced by the relevant action; or is it to help determine the standard of selfcontrol that we expect in the face of such provocation? sober.
Yet, in R v Smith, 64 the House of Lords opted, by a majority, to broaden the class of relevant characteristics to include not just depression, the factor that was relevant there, but any characteristic that might be thought to have a just bearing on the defendant's ability to exercise self-control, whether or not that characteristic amounted to a recognized medical disorder. Clearly the word 'just' was expected to do a large amount of work.
Furthermore, it was to be left entirely to the jury, with no further guidance from the trial judge, to determine which characteristics were relevant. This gave the jury considerable latitude over the scope of the defence: might they not conclude that even drunkenness or irascibility were relevant?
Concerns here are greatly lessened by Court of Appeal's recent ruling in R v James and Karimi 65 that the decision of the Privy Council in Holley had had the effect of over-ruling the decision of the House of Lords in Smith.
Yet, even without this ruling, we suspect that the latitude introduced by
Smith was far less than it has been taken to be, since the function of the subjective test has been insufficiently appreciated.
From what we have said so far, it should be clear that the law restricts the scope of the provocation defence so that it cannot be extended to individuals who are habitually short-tempered or drunk. These are factors that themselves remove self-control, so it is simply not there to be lost as a result of provocation. We do not mean that such people will have no selfcontrol whatsoever; but that they have insufficient self-control to inhibit them from homicide, and hence will not have something that the provocation can undermine. This is particularly important in the English or about depression, the factor that was central in Smith? We start with youth, where it might look as though our account says too much. For it might appear that, in so far as youth is relevant, it can only serve to reduce the amount of self-control that the defendant has. On this view, youth would be much like irascibility. But, then, like irascibility, it would be inconsistent with passing the subjective test.
However, that is not the only way to understand the effects of youth.
There is an alternative that, we suggest, is better supported by both common observation and the scientific findings. The alternative holds that 66 Where there is no reasonable possibility that the defendant had been both provoked and, as a result, lost his self-control a judge is entitled to withdraw the issue of provocation from the jury (see n. 39 above). 67 We leave aside discussion of the role of gender, since we know of no cases where this has been an issue.
youth does not reduce the amount of self-control that the defendant has.
Rather, it makes that self-control more vulnerable to undermining by factors like provocation. Youth is not like irascibility, whether this is understood as a tendency to react violently without losing self-control, or as the tendency to lose self-control habitually. Indeed, a youthful defendant who did exhibit general irascibility would be less able to avail themselves of the provocation defence on precisely that ground. The effect of youth is on the defendant's behaviour in extreme circumstances. Extreme provocation will be more likely to result in a youthful defendant's self-control being undermined and hence to him into killing. The empirical evidence, such as it is, bears out this picture. It looks as though the adolescent and young adult brain is simply less efficient at using the pre-frontal cortex for tasks like self-control: it is more likely to be overloaded.
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What of the issue in R v Smith: depression? This will turn on the way that depression affects those who have it. Does it have the effect of removing the agent's self-control? If so, a depressed agent will not pass the subjective test, since that agent's self-control will already be absent at the time of the provocation. Or does it rather give a different kind of selfcontrol, a kind that is more easily undermined? If so, the depressed agent will follow the pattern of the youth in passing the subjective testalthough that does not, by itself, imply that youth and depression will fare the same when they confront the objective test. This is a difficult question, not least because a tendency to angry response is not even a typical characteristic of depression: it is not, for instance, listed in the criteria given in DSM-VI. 69 On the contrary, depression tends to flatten affect.
We incline to the view that, in so far as there is reason to go one way rather than the other, serious depression tends to remove self-control, rather than rendering it more readily undermined in extreme circumstances.
Evidence for this comes from the observation noted above that depression, in so far as it affects self-control, tends to remove it across the board: it typically removes, for instance, the ability to stick to a diet. There is no evidence of a pattern of behaviour amongst the depressed that mirrors the pattern we have attributed to the young. Thus, we take issue with the implicit contention in Smith that depression, in so far as it is a relevant factor in a provocation defence, can be relevant in a way that is consistent with that defence. Indeed, so much should be clear from Lord Hoffman's own words. For, in summarizing the evidence presented in the initial trial, he said:
A psychiatrist called by the defence, who had seen Smith in prison less that a fortnight after the offence, said that he was suffering from an abnormality of mind, namely depression, which could reduce his "threshold for erupting with violence". Another said that he was suffering from clinical depression which made him "more disinhibited," i.e. less able to control his reactions.
70
The first of these comments is consistent with either interpretation. But, according to the second, it seems clear that, in so far as it had had an effect, the depression worked to remove Smith's self-control. According to this psychiatrist, it was the depression, and not the provocation, that had made him less able to control his reactions. If this is right, then depression, in so far as it is relevant at all to the provocation defence (which we rather doubt), works in a way that is inconsistent with that defence.
In saying this, we do not contend that depression is irrelevant as a factor supplying the basis for a partial defence against murder charges. But these considerations indicate that its application should be by means of the diminished responsibility defence laid out in section 2 of the Homicide Act Association, 1994 -33 -did not.
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Clearly losing self-control in such a way that one kills someone is a much more significant thing than bursting into tears. But, like crying, resisting it can take great effort. 78 The law thinks agents should make that effort, as is shown by the fact that the provocation defence does not lead to acquittal.
Equally though, it thinks that, if the effort was one that could not reasonably be required, the offence is less grievous than murder. So here is a second role for the objective limb: not just to ensure that the defendant has retained some sense of proportion, but to ensure that they cannot have been required to do more to resist the loss of control.
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
We conclude by outlining some further implications of the model that we have developed. In particular, the model makes clear three ways in which the provocation defence is currently restricted; and correspondingly, three ways in which it might be broadened. In the first place, the defence might be broadened to include killings that result from loss of self-control in response to factors other than anger: factors like fear, or of 'extreme emotional disturbance' more generally. Second, it might include killings that result from such factors in the absence of self-control, with no requirement that the self-control have been lost. Third, it might include killings that result from such factors even when self-control is still present.
The provocation defence in its current form has clearly emerged from a long history; 79 it would not be surprising if it contained features that were 77 We were led to consider the case of crying by David Velleman's discussion in 'How We Get Along', ms, available at http://homepages.nyu.edu/~dv26/. 78 We thus take a more nuanced position than Horder who takes the fact that an agent 'permits' him or herself to lose control as showing that the loss of control is not involuntary. (See 'Reshaping the Subjective Element in the Provocation Defence', n. 4 above, p. 128). In one sense, this is right; but losing control is hardly a voluntary action either. 79 For an excellent review see Horder, Provocation and Responsibility, n. 12 above not applicable to modern times. Broadening the defence in something like the first way does seem to involve the removal of a feature that is largely arbitrary. As Horder has recently stressed, why should somebody who acts from fear rather than anger not be able to avail themselves of the defence?
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Fear, too, can undermine self-control, and, as Horder points out, is a more likely response to provocation in cases where the provoker is the more powerful. Legal opinion is turning to recognize this. In Smith, Lord
Hoffmann indicated that there are cases where fear may now provide a sufficient basis for invoking the provocation defence: 'the law now recognises that the emotions which may cause loss of self-control are not confined to anger but may include fear and despair'.
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In contrast, we contend that broadening the provocation defence in either the second or third ways would involve a radical revision, something that would result in a totally new defence. 82 It is of the essence of the current defence to accommodate a particular human failing: the tendency to lose self-control in response to provocation. If this is broadened to include cases where self-control is lacking for some other reason, then we open the way to a huge number of possible claims. Perhaps some of these have a legitimate standing; others-where self-control is missing from irascibility or drunkenness, or from a frustrated sense of entitlement, or a festering resentment-do not. Opening the defence to include killings where selfcontrol is not absent introduces even more. Perhaps an objective test can be used to rule out all of these cases, but there is no guarantee that it will. And even if it does, the invitation to spurious defences given by broadening the provocation defence, and the complexity and uncertainty this would introduce, are to be avoided. Better, surely, to retain the provocation defence just for the job that it has evolved to do, and then to introduce 80 See 'Reshaping the Subjective Element in the Provocation Defence', n. 4 above. 81 n. 60 above, at p. 673. 82 The Law Commission has suggested taking what is, in effect, the third of these options, dropping a -35 -further defences for further cases should these prove necessary.
83
requirement of loss of self control altogether; see n. 4 above. 83 Horder aims to bring further cases under the scope of the provocation defence-a defendant who kills an assailant who indecently assaults her, fearing, unreasonably but as a result of the extreme emotional disturbance that the assault engenders, that he will go further; or a defendant who kills a burglar in his house, fearing, again unreasonably but as a result of the extreme emotional disturbance engendered, that that he might attack him. These cases would fall under the scope of minimally extended provocation defence that we advocate. For in both cases there is a loss of self-control, though one manifested in fear rather than anger. What is distinctive in Horder's proposal, and not captured by ours, is a requirement that fear for one's own safety (or the safety of others) be a necessary condition for employing the provocation defence. See 'Reshaping the Subjective Element in the Provocation Defence', n. 4 above, pp. 134ff. We leave open the question whether this would be a good reform, merely noting that it is quite consistent with what we are arguing here, namely that the loss of self control should remain necessary too.
